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Abstract
The involvement of the world’s primary developed credit markets in the US
at the heart of the global financial crisis poses some particularly diﬃcult chal-
lenges to the contagion modelling literature. US credit markets have often been
used as a benchmark market for global economic conditions, but their intrinsic
involvement further complicates our understanding of the transmission of finan-
cial market shocks. This paper demonstrates how the involvement of benchmark
assets may result in falls in the correlation between asset markets, even in the
presence of increased volatility in common or benchmark assets and the presence
of contagion.
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1 Introduction
The financial crises of the 1990s and early 2000s stimulated the development of a num-
ber of new methodologies for understanding and measuring the transmissions of crises
between markets. One of these developments has been in the measurement, detection
and analysis of contagion eﬀects. Contagion is generally taken to refer to the extra
transmissions of shocks between financial markets that occur through additional link-
ages which appear only during the crisis period. These additional linkages or channels
may arise through transmissions between particular asset markets (for example credit
market conditions) or from a particular country (such as the US) or from a particular
asset (such as subprime mortgages). Theoretical support for such changes occurs via
informational asymmetries (Yuan, 2005 and Calvo and Mendoza, 2000), wealth eﬀects
(Kyle and Xiong, 2001) and portfolio rebalancing (Flemming, Kirby and Ostdiek, 1998
and Kodres and Pritsker, 2002) for examples. More recently, the eﬀects of crises in
breaking down linkages between financial institutions under stress has been explored
using network theory (Allen and Babus, 2008).
The involvement of the world’s primary developed credit markets in the US at the
heart of the current crisis poses some particularly diﬃcult challenges to the contagion
modelling literature. Contagion has previously been regarded as a mainly developing
markets problem, with developed markets acting as mere conduits of volatility from
a source problem market to another developing market; see Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2003). This assumption results in some convenient modelling properties, as the de-
veloped market, particularly the US, then provide a benchmark for global economic
conditions, see for example Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Dungey et al (2006). An
implication of this is that a number of the contagion modelling techniques are se-
riously challenged by the current crisis. This paper examines these problems, and
demonstrates, using a simulation experiment, that the involvement of a benchmark
asset such as the US credit market, results in a further complication in untangling the
linkages between financial markets during crises.
The analysis highlights the eﬀects of volatility in a benchmark asset on the corre-
lation structure of asset returns during financial crises. It is well known that in many
crises the correlation between assets increases, partly as a result of generally increased
volatility. Change in correlations evident after controlling for increased volatility in
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common conditions is usually interpreted as evidence of contagion. While Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) consider contagion as increased correlation only, most authors allow
for eﬀects in either direction - network theory provides a theoretical interpretation of
declines in correlation as contagion via broken linkages during crises.
The simulation experiments conducted here show that observed changes in corre-
lation coeﬃcients may result from any of a number of changes in shock propogation.
Additional volatility in common global conditions undoubtedly increases correlations.
But increased volatility in a benchmark asset, without the addition of contagion chan-
nels, is consistent with both increased and decreased correlation eﬀects. Contagion
eﬀects in a system with a benchmark asset may be associated with either increases
or decreases in correlation between asset returns compared with a non-crisis period.
This leads us to suggest a need for caution in interpreting evidence - the role of the
benchmark asset needs to be clearly separated from other eﬀects, and indeed from the
increasingly popular view of the current crisis as a failure of financial networks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline three simple tests for the
existence of contagion eﬀects drawn from the existing literature and present some evi-
dence on contagion in international equity markets during the current crisis. This forms
the background for our discussion of evidence for contagion. Section 3 then lays out
the challenges posed to contagion testing by the existence of common global influences
and benchmark assets. This section develops a formal model for incorporating these
aspects into financial returns. In section 4 we conduct a number of experiments using
a calibrated version of the theoretical model. The simulated returns are subject to the
three tests conducted in the earlier section, and we examine the behaviour of returns
in response to increases in volatility in common factors, in the benchmark asset and in
response to contagion eﬀects in turn. The results form the basis of our conclusions in
Section 5.
2 Collecting Empirical Evidence
As an example of the diﬃculties in interpreting the empirical evidence for contagion
three relatively straight forward tests for the existence of contagion are applied to equity
market data for the crisis of 2007-2009. The three tests are the heteroskedasticity
adjusted correlation test of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), denoted FR, a multivariate
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Chow test version of the Forbes and Rigobon test developed in Dungey et al (2005a)
denoted here as the contagion Chow test or CCT, and the non-linear contagion test
of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2005), denoted BKS. The basics of these tests are outlined
below with more details provided in Dungey et al (2005a,b), including a discussion of
their interrelationships.
2.1 Test specifications
Consider the case of a matrix of return series for markets and  observations, where a
return for a particular market at a particular time is denoted    = 1      = 1    
The FR test is conducted on correlation coeﬃcients of returns, where the correlation
coeﬃcient of a non-crisis period is compared with the correlation coeﬃcient of the
crisis period to gauge whether there has been a statistically significant increase in
correlation between the two periods. The innovation of the FR test is that it takes into
account that correlation coeﬃcients generally (although not necessarily - see Dungey
et al, 2005a) rise during a crisis, and controls for this heteroskedasticity. Denoting
the correlation coeﬃcient between two asset returns during the non-crisis period as
where following Forbes and Rigobon,  the non-crisis period is defined as the total
sample period, and   the two assets involved in the correlation, and correspondingly
 as the correlation coeﬃcient between the corresponding asset returns in the crisis
period the FR test can be represented as
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where  is the number of observations in the total sample period,  the number of
observations in the crisis period, and  is the correlation coeﬃcient in the crisis period
adjusted for the higher volatility
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The denominator of  contains the volatility of the asset return in the country which
is deemed to be transmitting the contagious shocks. For this reason the FR test has a
strong exogeneity assumption and the crisis country should be identified exogenously.
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Extending the FR test to a multivariate version (the CCT test) involves recognising
that the test is essentially a Chow test. By scaling the returns appropriately, the FR
test can be recast as a single test on a parameter. The test can be written asµ 

¶
= 0 + 1 + 1
µ 

¶
+ 1
µ 

¶
 +  (3)
where  are the returns for the market receiving contagion from the designated crisis
market whose returns are denoted , and  () represents volatility in returns
in market  () during the non-crisis period. The dummy variable  takes the value 1
during periods of crisis and 0 otherwise. A test of whether 1 = 0 in equation (3) is
equivalent to the FR test in equation (1). The Chow test form can clearly be extended
to a multivariate case where testing for contagion to the market represented by  from
multiple other potential sources isµ 

¶
= 0 + 1 +
X
=16=

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
¶
+
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
µ 
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¶
 +  (4)
Tests of no contagion may then be constructed as tests of the significance of parameters

The BKS test takes the view that the relationship between returns is non linear
across the distribution of returns, so that the interrelationship between tail returns in
diﬀerent assets should be modelled separately from the remainder of the distribution.
To this end a threshold () defining the tails of the returns distribution needs
to be predetermined, usually this is chosen to be the 5% tail. The BKS methodology
then constructs a dummy variable  which takes the value 1 when the return  is
in the tail of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. More formally
 =
½
1 : ||  
0 : otherwise
 (5)
Once this variable has been constructed a count of coexceedances is undertaken, where
a coexceedance between  and  occurs when  = 1 To obtain the coexceedance
index for crises originating with asset return  any point in time we calculate
Ψ =
X
=16=
 (6)
The BKS test for the presence of contagion eﬀects in return  is then constructed by
running a multinomial logit regression with dependent variable  and explanatory
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variables which include coexceedances between other assets returns, Ψ as well as a
set of variables expected to explain asset returns in each market involved (for example
Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2005) consider interest rates and exchange rates in modelling
contagion in stock returns).
While the FR test is clearly bivariate, both the CCT and BKS test provide results
for bivariate pairs and overall tests of contagion between multiple asset returns. Each
test requires some exogenous choices to the model. Prior to implementation, both the
FR and CCT test require choices of the (exogenous) source market of the contagion
eﬀects as well as the definition of the crisis and non-crisis sample periods. Neither of
these choices is innocuous. The BKS test requires an a priori choice of the source
country for contagion, but does not require a crisis subsample definition. The crisis
observations are determined endogeneously given an exogeneously chosen threshold for
the tail events in equation (5).
2.2 Test implementation
To illustrate the diﬃculties in interpreting contagion test results the FR, CCT and BKS
tests are applied to equity market returns for the Euro Area, the UK and the US using
the EuroSTOXX50 index, the FTSE100 index and the S&P500 index, respectively. All
series are collected in US dollar terms to control for potential exchange rate eﬀects,
and are recorded at 4pm GMT to control for potential time zone eﬀects; see Martens
and Poon (2001) and Kleimeier, Lehnert and Verschoor (2008). The tests are applied
to examine contagion eﬀects emerging from the US as the source country with data
collected from August 2, 2004 until March 23, 2009, a total of 1212 observations. In the
FR and CCT tests the non-crisis period is designated as prior to August 9, 2007. On
this date, the European Central Bank initiated a series of actions to distribute funds to
the market which was suﬀering a liquidity squeeze in the wake of reassessment of the
creditworthiness of the asset backed security market, an action which accompanied the
announcement of the cessation of redemptions on a number of BNP Paribas investment
funds. The US Federal Reserve and several other central banks acted to extend liquidity
to the market very shortly thereafter. The non-crisis period in the sample covers 788
observations, and the crisis period 424 observations.
Descriptive statistics and correlation coeﬃcients for the asset returns are shown in
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics for returns on the EuroSTOXX50, FTSE100 and the S&P500
indices for August 2, 2004 to March 23, 2009. All data are recorded at 4pm GMT.
Euro Area UK US
non crisis: Aug 2, 2004 - Aug 8, 2007
mean 0.055 0.043 0.033
max 2.362 2.604 2.005
min -2.793 -3.197 -2.245
variance 0.596 0.476 0.374
crisis: Aug 9, 2007 - Mar 23, 2009
mean -0.175 -0.117 -0.149
max 8.895 9.384 10.945
min -8.042 -9.266 -10.136
variance 4.343 4.332 4.524
total: Aug 2, 2004 - Mar 23, 2009
mean -0.024 -0.012 -0.028
max 8.895 9.384 10.945
min -8.042 -9.266 -10.136
variance 1.916 1.829 1.833
Tables 1 and 2. The tables are broken into the sub-period of the non-crisis period,
the crisis period and the total sample period. It is clear that the general expectation
of higher unconditional correlation coeﬃcients during periods of crisis, often taken as
evidence of reduced diversification opportunities, is evident in the data considered here.
In applying the tests of contagion, the returns are assumed to have been stripped of
common factors, and thus represent excess returns. Here we follow Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) for the FR test and create excess returns by gathering the residuals from a single
VAR(1) in the daily equity returns over the entire period with an exogeneous control
variable of the US federal funds rate to represent the common global conditions.
Table 3 shows the results of the three contagion tests. Each test has the null
hypothesis of no contagion, so that a statistically significant result is consistent with
a rejection of the null hypothesis, and is evidence for contagion. In the illustrative
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Table 2:
Correlation coeﬃcients between returns in on the EuroSTOXX50, FTSE100 and the
S&P500 indices for August 2, 2004 to March 23, 2009. All data are recorded at 4pm
GMT.
Euro Area UK US
non crisis: Aug 2, 2004 - Aug 8, 2007
Euro Area 1.000 0.818 0.797
UK 1.000 0.689
US 1.000
crisis: Aug 9, 2007 - Mar 23, 2009
Euro Area 1.000 0.888 0.881
UK 1.000 0.827
US 1.000
total: Aug 2, 2004 - Mar 23, 2009
Euro Area 1.000 0.875 0.864
UK 1.000 0.806
US 1.000
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equity data used here, the bivariate FR tests find no evidence of contagion, while the
BKS test finds evidence of contagion from the US equity market to all other markets.
The CCT tests are somewhere in between with mixed results. Although the joint test
reveals contagion from the US to the Euro Area and the UK, contagion just to the
Euro Area is not significant.
Table 3:
Test statistics for null of no contagion from the US equity market to the equity
markets of the UK and Euro Area using the bivariate FR test, the CCT test and the
BKS test.
Test Recipient country
Euro Area UK Both
FR -5.187 -4.830 n.a.
(1.000) (1.000)
CCT 0.002 6.062* 5.703
(0.968) (0.014) (0.058)
BKS 56.688* 21.798* 143.701*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
note:the CCT bivariate and joint tests have 1 and 2 degrees of freedom respectively.
* denotes significance at the 0.05 level of significance.
3 The global economic conditions problem
The examples given in Section 2.2 illustrate the performance of three common contagion
tests on equity markets in the global financial crisis. However, many would argue that
this is simply the sideshow to the real problems which have emerged. The pivot of this
crisis has been in credit markets, and particularly with the behaviour of short term
credit markets such as interbank markets which has, at times, frozen. Hence, we may
wish to measure contagion in credit and bond markets. Ideally, we wish to examine
cross market, cross country contagion eﬀects within a single model. There is a small, but
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growing literature attempting to implement such models, see for example Dungey and
Martin (2007) who consider foreign exchange and equity markets jointly, Dungey, Fry,
González-Hermosillo, Martin and Tang (2009) who consider sovereign bond markets
and equity markets jointly, as well as Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2004) who
examine pairs of equity and bond markets across geographical borders. This would be
one way to approach the problem.
Two particular problems arise in the current crisis. The first is that short term US
interest rates are commonly used in the literature as the control for the global factor
as in the example in Section 2 and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The second is that
in modelling crises in credit markets the interest rate data display high persistence.
This is usually overcome by examining instead the spread between the credit market
of interest and some benchmark rate - where the benchmark is often the US short term
money market rate.
These two problems present us with essential challenges. We need to know how
contagion tests are aﬀected by problems arising from volatility in benchmark assets,
such as US interest rates, as well as in global control variables. To examine this we
return to a workhorse model previously used to simulate the behaviour of markets in
crisis, and amend it to accommodate these most recent crisis period characteristics.
The model is drawn from the work in Dungey and Martin (2004, 2007) and used in
simulation experiments in Dungey, Fry and Martin (2006). In the latter case the role
of a common benchmark is not accounted for. Here, a model is simulated based on
that recently estimated for equity and bond markets in the current crisis in Dungey
(2008). Dungey (2008) augments a factor model of contagion to account for a common
benchmark asset, namely a US Treasury rate.
3.1 Global market linkages in non-crisis times
To motivate the model design, consider that many financial market asset prices or
returns may be represented by a latent factor model, as suggested in Longin and Solnik
(1995) and Mahieu and Schotman (1994). In this case the return for an asset type 
in country  at time , , may be modelled as a linear combination of two latent
factors, representing systematic and diversifiable risk
 =  +  (7)
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where  represents the time-varying systematic risk aﬀecting all assets,   although
with potentially diﬀerent impact coeﬃcients,  and  is the time-varying idiosyn-
cratic risk associated with that asset, which has a constant impact coeﬃcient  In
the case of a multimarket, multicountry model, this can be augmented for any given
asset by a factor representing the country of origin, and a factor representing the asset
market concerned. Thus we capture common country risk and common market risk by
modifying equation (7) as follows
 =  +  +  +  (8)
where  represents the time varying country specific factor, and the time varying
market specific factor. To illustrate, if we desire to model the bond market and the
equity market simultaneously for 3 countries, then  = 3 and  = 2, making a total of
6 assets in the model under consideration.
However, to examine bond markets appropriately in this model, it needs to be aug-
mented to control for the behaviour of a benchmark interest rate. This allows interest
rates in each country to be assessed relative to that benchmark. In the past this has
been easily achieved by using the US interest rate as the benchmark and not consid-
ering the US specifically as a source country for contagion. Clearly, modification is
needed to account for this in the current environment.
Consider then, the case of modelling the interest rate in country  as a premium
over the US interest rate. Denoting the credit market as  =  the US interest rate
itself can be expressed as
 =  +  +  +  (9)
and the premium for an interest rate in country  6=  over the US interest rate can
be expressed as
 −  = ( − ) +  + ( − ) + 
− −  (10)
while equity market returns,  =  continue to be expressed as
 =  +  +  +  (11)
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The system represented by equations (10) and (11) then contains a number of
common elements. The first is that due to the global common factor, or systematic
risk factor, given by  which aﬀects all markets regardless of geographical location
or asset type. The second is a market factor,  for the equity market and 
for the bond markets. Then there are common country factors which link across the
diﬀerent asset markets in a particular country denoted by . The country factor of
 plays a special role. It appears in every interest rate spread as well as the US
equity market return. This links US equity market developments firmly to international
bond markets, and represents the commonly observed importance of the US market in
transmitting shocks across asset markets. Finally there are undiversifiable shocks to
each of the asset markets in each country ().
3.2 Global market linkages in crisis times
Equations (10) and (11) represent the linkages between a system in normal times.
During times of crisis, contagion refers to the emergence of additional linkages (either
positive or negative) which may occur during these periods. This enables the capture
of many diﬀerent forms of contagion as explained in the survey article of Dungey et al
(2005a). These extra linkages do not result from the existing links: a transmission of
additional common shocks during crisis would be captured by the same parameters as
the model already given, but be represented by increased volatility in the time varying
factors themselves. Rather, the contagion eﬀects come about through newly emerging
links between the  and the idiosyncratic factors.
The global financial crisis has created a particular interest in the eﬀects of contagion
from US markets to others - and most importantly the eﬀects of contagion from the
US credit and equity markets. Consider first a model which allows for contagion eﬀects
from the US credit market by augmenting equations (10) and (11) with an additional
eﬀect from the idiosycnratic factor  This results in an expression for the
premium of an interest rate in country  6=  over the US interest rate
 −  = ( − ) +  + ( − ) + 
− + ( − 1) (12)
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while equity market returns ( = ) are
 =  +  +  +  +   (13)
The parameter  represents the contagion eﬀect on asset type  in country , origi-
nating from asset type  in country 
In the case where the contagious shock originates in the US equity market then
equations (10) and (11) take the form
 −  = ( − ) +  + ( − ) + 
− −  +   (14)
while equity market returns,  =  are expressed as
 =  +  +  +  +   (15)
To combine eﬀects from both markets, that is potential contagion from the US
credit market and the US equity market the final form of the equations representing
bond premia and equity market returns are respectively
 −  = ( − ) +  +  + ( − ) + 
− + ( − 1) +   (16)
and
 = ++++ +  (17)
Individual tests of the hypothesis of no contagion from the benchmark US credit market
are represented by whether  = 0 for a chosen  , and tests for contagion from US
equity markets are represented by whether  = 0 for a chosen  . Thus a test of
no contagion from US equity markets to any other markets would be represented as
 = 0 for all   and for no contagion from US credit markets to any other markets
as  = 0 for all  , and an overall joint test of no contagion in the system by
 = 0 for all   
4 Simulation experiments
The aim of this paper is to examine the properties of correlations between asset classes
when subject to an increase in volatility of a common benchmark asset which may in
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fact be the source asset for the crisis. A series of simulation experiments based on
the model above provides the framework for the analysis. The impacts of changing
diﬀerent elements of the linkages existing in a crisis period are analyzed in terms
of their impacts on contagion tests. In doing this we also examine the impact of
increases in the volatility of common factors. Increased volatility in common factors
has previously been shown to reveal itself as changes in correlation structures, and the
additional benchmark factor here may exacerbate or moderate their eﬀects in terms of
the analysis of contagion evidence.
The results are also analyzed in the presence of pure contagion in a way that con-
tagion as outlined in the previous section. Consistent with common tests of contagion,
the simulation results are all presented in terms of the changes in the correlation be-
tween the asset returns attributable to alternative sources of change in the structure.
These are the result of the introduction of structural breaks to accommodate greater
volatility in factors, or the introduction of contagion eﬀects from either the US credit
market or the US equity market. The correlations for the simulated data reported
without structural breaks of contagious linkages (the baseline case) provide the point
of comparison. This is akin to the non-crisis case in the real data.
4.1 The baseline
The design of the baseline simulation is as follows. First we consider a parameterisation
of the model for 3 countries, consistent with the number of countries in the empirical
example in Section 2. We denote the third country,  = 3 as the  or benchmark asset
and the two assets represent credit and equity markets,  =   This parameterization
corresponds with the model in equations (10) and (11) of the baseline representing the
non-crisis period and are summarized in Table 4. Each of the factors,  and
 are initially randomly drawn from a (0 1) distribution. The sample size of the
simulated dataset is 700 observations, which is roughly the size of the non-crisis sample
period considered in Section 2.2 This parameterisation gives a set of asset returns which
look as given in Figure 1 representing asset returns.1
The choice of parameters for the non-crisis period is based on two premises. The
first is that equity markets are relatively more internationally integrated than credit
1The Figures show that the simulated data are not dissimilar to observed data, although the
presence of volatility clustering and fat tails is not incorporated into the simulation model.
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Figure 1:
Simulated data for the non-crisis period based on parameter estimates contained in
Table 4.
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(c) credit market 2 [2] (d) equity market 2 [2]
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Table 4:
Parameterization of the baseline simulation experiment.
 = 1  = 2  = 
 =   =   =   =   =   = 
 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6
 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1
 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.1
markets, and that credit markets reflect the underlying fundamentals (or country risk)
of a country much more closely than do equity markets. Given these premises, the
common factor parameters,  are chosen so that the credit markets are less aﬀected
by the common factors than the equity markets, with a range between 02 and 04 for
the credit markets (), and between 04 and 07 for the equity markets. Of the credit
markets, the parameter for the US () is 02 which is the smallest for the credit
markets reflecting that it is likely that the US actually provides much of the common
factor in its observed behaviour given that it represents the benchmark already. The
parameters on the country factor () are higher in each country for the bond market
than the equity market. The bond markets respond little to the bond market factor¡¢ which captures movements common to the bond market internationally in com-
parison to the response of the equity market to its own market factor shocks
¡¢.
Finally, the idiosyncratic parameters
¡¢ are substantially higher for the bond mar-
ket than the equity market. Within each asset return, examination of the relative
parameter magnitudes also reflects that the country and idiosyncratic parameters are
most important for the bond market and that the global and market factors are most
important for the equity market.
To illustrate the properties of the simulation under the parameterization of the
benchmark scenario, Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the data as in Figure
1. Comparison of the non-crisis correlations of the simulated returns with those of the
actual equity returns data in Table 2 shows that the values are reasonably close in
range. This provides the baseline scenario to which the crisis period scenarios explored
in the simulation experiments are compared in Section 4.2.
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Table 5:
Correlation coeﬃcients of simulated model in non-crisis period.
 = 1  = 2  = 
     
 = 1 r 1.000
q 0.156 1.000
 = 2 r 0.379 0.129 1.000
q 0.057 0.707 0.177 1.000
 =  r -0.603 0.212 -0.497 0.166 1.000
q 0.039 0.874 0.104 0.782 0.285 1.000
4.2 The experiments.
The fundamental problem facing analysts and policymakers when examining crisis data
is that it is unclear whether an observed change in the correlation structure is due to a
change in the underlying volatility of the common global factor (), a change in the
volatility of the benchmark factor being propogated throughout markets () or
contagion from either of two markets involved in the system, propogated as shown in
equations (16) and (17). By simulating the system we can cleanly diﬀerentiate these
eﬀects. Thus 4 experiments are undertaken as follows.
1. Experiment I: Increased volatility in the common world factor . In the bench-
mark non-crisis case ∼ (0 1) in experiment I, ∼ (0 1) where 1  1
2. Experiment II: Increased volatility in the benchmark credit market factor .
In the benchmark non-crisis case  ∼ (0 1) in experiment II,  ∼
(0 2) where 2  1
3. Experiment III: Contagion from US credit markets to other markets. This is
achieved by setting   0 in equation (16).
4. Experiment IV: Contagion from US equity markets to other markets. This is
achieved by setting   0 in equation (17).
Table 6 gives the values of the contagion parameters used in the simulations which
range across the values 0.5 to 0.9. Figure 2 presents the simulated data generated
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under each experiment. There are 500 observations simulated for each experiment,
again consistent with the sample size of the crisis period data considered in Section
2.2. The results of each experiment with more specific details on the crisis period
parameterisations are discussed in the following subsections.
Table 6:
Parameterization of the contagion eﬀects in the simulation experiments III and IV.
Experiment III Experiment IV
  =   =   =   = 
 = 1 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7
 = 2 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.9
 =  - 0.6 0.7 -
4.2.1 Experiment I: increased volatility in the common global factor
Experiment I represents the case most commonly cited as causing problems in de-
tecting contagion vis-à-vis simply increased interdependence; most notably Forbes and
Rigobon (2002). In conducting these experiments, the simulations are run with in-
creasing levels of volatility in the common world factor, such that 1 = 1 210 An
example of the simulated data in this experiment is given for the case of 1 = 5 in
the first column of Figure 1. Compared with Figure 2 (or the first 700 observations in
Figure 1) there is an increase in volatility in each asset shown. This is most evident
in the equity market plots (panels m, q and u) which have the larger corresponding
parameters 
The changes in the correlation coeﬃcients between each of the diﬀerent assets from
the benchmark during Experiment I are noted for each asset at each value of 1, and
the corresponding plots are given in the first column of Figure 3. Positive values on
these figures mean that the correlation coeﬃcient between those assets has increased
over the benchmark correlation given in Table 5. As the volatility of the common factor
rises (as 1 increases), the correlation coeﬃcient for each asset pair also increases, as
shown in the left hand column of Figure 3. It is worth noting that the correlation
increases the most for the pairs 1 and 2 (panel I(a) of Figure 3). Both
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Figure 2:
Examples of the simulated data for each experiment. The first 700 obsevations
correspond to the benchmark data in each case. The final 500 observations
correspond to the data generated in the experiments. Experiment I (column 1) with
1 = 5, Experiment II (column 2) 2 = 5, Experiment III (column 3)
 =  × 5, Experiment IV (column 4)  =  × 5.
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1 and 2 have the highest degree of response to the common factor (see Table 4 on
parameter set up), but they display the greatest increase in correlation when paired
with the lower reacting credit market, the US. When paired together, their increase
in correlation is not as evident. This is particularly interesting, as the pair 12 are
the least correlated of the credit markets in the benchmark case given in Table 7 but
the only slightly more correlated case of 1 experiences the greatest increase in
correlation during the crisis.
4.2.2 Experiment II: increased volatility in the benchmarket asset factor
In experiment II the volatility of the benchmark asset factor, , given by 2 is
increased such that 2 = 1 210 The right hand column of Figure 3 shows the impact
on correlation coeﬃcients of each asset pair of an increase in the volatility of the
benchmark US credit factor, with the horizontal axis in each figure showing the case
for increasing levels of volatility, 2
Unlike the case of the increase in the volatility of the common factor from exper-
iment I, the increases in volatility in the benchmark US credit factor present varying
results. In the case of the correlation between 1 and 2 the asset  acts as a
common factor as it enters both equations with coeﬃcients − and the correlation
rises (see panel II(a) of the right hand column of Figure 3) This is consistent with the
common factor results in I(a) of the same figure. However, in that same panel it is
apparent that the increase in the volatility in the benchmark factor has reduced the
correlation between each of 1 and 2 with the benchmark asset This is clearly
a result of the diﬀerent signs on coeﬃcients entering any expression explaining the
evolution of  where  enters with the opposite sign to that apparent in the
construction of the premia  −  as shown in equation (10).
Panel II(b) of the right hand column of Figure 3 shows no change in the correlation
structure of the equity market returns, reflecting the lack of impact that the benchmark
US credit factor has in the equity market equations - see equation (11). Panels II(c)
to II(e) of the right hand side of Figure 3 show that correlations decrease in the cross
market correlations. The correlations are aﬀected by the benchmark factor but in the
opposite direction to the eﬀects of a volatility increase in the common global factor.
The results make for an interesting tie with the existing literature where the ma-
jority of the literature on contagion reports rising correlation in response to conta-
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gion eﬀects, although not always ruling out decreases as evidence, while the relatively
newer network literature on contagion, particularly related to banking networks, views
contagion as breaks in linkages in the network which are consistent with decreasing
correlation. In the simulations of experiments I and II we have shown that it is pos-
sible to produce both of these outcomes. Simply changing the extent of volatility in
the common factor causes an increase in correlation, while increasing volatility in the
benchmark factor can be causal to a decrease in correlation. It appears that the in-
volvement of a benchmark market can lead to observed outcomes consistent with what
network contagion predicts without any actual changes in the network.
4.2.3 Experiments III and IV: Contagion eﬀects
Contagion eﬀects from the US credit market are simulated in Experiment III by in-
troducing positive values of the parameter  . In each simulation the relative size
of the contagion parameters reported in Table 6 are multipled by an integer, ranging
from 0 to 10 The corresponding change in correlation coeﬃcient over the baseline is
given for each pair of assets in the left hand column of Figure 4. It is apparent in
panel III(a) of the figure that the correlation coeﬃcient between all combinations of
credit markets increase. Contagion eﬀects from US credit markets also have a positive
eﬀect on correlations between equity markets, panel III(b) and on correlations between
the non-US credit markets and each of the equity markets, panels III(c) and III(d).
However, the correlation pairs involving the US benchmark interest rate and all equity
markets, panel III(e) decline as a result of the contagion eﬀects.
The simulation of contagion eﬀects from US equity markets on the asset pairs pro-
duce some similarities, shown in the right hand side column of Figure 4. At stronger
levels of contagion,   1, the correlation coeﬃcient between all credit markets and
the US credit market unambiguously rise in each instance, panel IV(a). Correlations
between all equity pairs rise, although contagion eﬀects do dampen this slightly reg-
istering a fall in correlations for the pairing with the US equity market (1 and
2) where contagion is relatively weaker. In cross market pairings not involving
the US credit market, correlations rise, panels IV(c) and IV(d). However, for cases
where the US credit market is involved as one part of the correlation pair, panel IV(e),
the correlation coeﬃcients fall, unambiguously for the case of  
In the case of the cross correlations involving the US credit market and the equity
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Figure 3:
Change in correlation over baseline case associated with Experiment I: increase in
common factor volatility (left hand side column) and Experiment II: increase in
benchmark US credit factor volatility (right hand side column).
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markets 1 and 2 at low levels of contagion  = 1 the contagion eﬀect results in
a slightly positive increase in correlation compared with the benchmark case for these
pairs.
The results of the simulation experiments show how diﬃcult it may be in observed
data to sort out the relative eﬀects of changes in volatility in common factors, bench-
mark markets and contagion from alternative markets. From a casual examination of
the correlation coeﬃcient between asset 1 and 2 it is very diﬃcult to determine
whether an observed increase in that coeﬃcient during a period of crisis is due to an
increase in volatility in the common factor, an increase in volatility in the benchmark
market factor or indeed due to contagion from any of a number of markets. In each of
the simulations for diﬀerent experiments the correlation between these two assets was
increased. On the other hand, where the benchmark market is clearly separated from
the other market under consideration (equity markets here), an increase in contagion
between assets in the other asset class seems to be attributable to either an increase
in volatility in the common factor or contagion from the non-benchmark market at
low levels. This is consistent with other literature pointing to the misleading eﬀects of
common factors on correlation coeﬃcients, see for example Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).
However, there is a caveat to even this result - in the presence of low levels of contagion
from the market in question, here the US equity markets, correlation coeﬃcients may
in fact rise. But in this case it is important to know that one of the assets involved is
the source of the contagion eﬀects.
Increased correlation between equity markets, here the non-benchmark market, is
attributable in our simulations to any of an increase in the volatility of the common
world factor or contagion from either market. Only in the case of correlations between
equity markets themselves is this distinguished as there is no change in the correlation
structure. Cross market eﬀects are even more complex. Increases in correlations not
involving  are potentially due to increases in common factor volatility or conta-
gion from either market. Only increases in volatility of the benchmark assets result
in a decline in correlation between these assets. However, in the case of correlations
involving the benchmark asset, the only evidence for increases in these correlations is
sourced with an increase in common factor volatility, or from relatively low levels of
contagion eﬀects in the non benchmark market. Increases in benchmark asset volatility
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Figure 4:
Change in correlation over baseline case associated with Experiment III: contagion
from the US credit market (left hand side column) and Experiment IV: contagion
from the US equity market (right hand side column).
III (a) credit market IV (a) credit market
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
III (b) equity market IV (b) equity market
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,Us,t
‐0.2
‐0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
III (c) credit mkt 1 with equity IV (c) credit mkt 1 with equity
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
III (d) credit mkts 2 with equity IV (d) credit mkt 2 with equity
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
III (e) US credit mkt with equity IV (e) US credit mkt with equity
‐0.3
‐0.2
‐0.1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
‐0.3
‐0.2
‐0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
yr,1,tyr,2,t yr,1,tyr,US,t yr,2,tyr,US,t
23
and contagion eﬀects otherwise all result in lower correlation coeﬃcients. This result
may well account for why the evidence in the most recent crisis is more supportive of
the network theory of failing linkages evidenced by reductions in correlation coeﬃcients
- structurally the result is the eﬀect of the source of the contagion being the benchmark
asset, a phenomenon not experienced in crises in recent history.
This section has used a relatively simple factor model to explore why the change in
the correlation structure observed with a financial crisis is quite diﬃcult to interpret.
While previous literature had uncovered the important role of the common factor eﬀects
in understanding this process, until the most recent crisis it had not been strictly
necessary to consider the impact of the involvement of benchmark markets in the
role of crisis market. The results show the important impact this has on the results.
The involvement of the benchmark asset can account for observed falls in correlation
coeﬃcients between asset returns, which are nevertheless consistent with the presence
of contagion eﬀects. As well as the overall common factor eﬀects on increasing volatility,
we also demonstrate that increased volatility in the benchmark factor can additionally
result in reduced volatility. Hence a number of the features of the current crisis - where
the originating market is the benchmark US credit market - are revealed as being logical
outcomes of the interactions of the data when both common shocks and benchmark
assets are involved.
Rather than being simply the developed market centre through which crises are
delivered to the periphery without being particularly involved in the volatility, as pro-
posed for earlier crises by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002), where the benchmark asset
is involved it distributes the eﬀects in a way that may at first seem counterintuitive.
Correlations increase between other markets, but correlations between the benchmark
asset and other markets may decrease. This may serve to confuse as previous evi-
dence has characterized crises as involving increased correlation eﬀects. The simulation
demonstrates that, as in the recent crisis, this does not always have to be the case.
More particularly, decreases in correlation may in fact be consistent with relatively
large contagion eﬀects.
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4.3 Application of contagion tests to the simulated data
Finally, we return to the application of the three simple contagion tests in Section 2, and
consider how those tests perform on the simulated data. Table 7 reports the eﬀects
of testing for contagion using the FR, CCT and BKS tests for the simulated credit
market data (where benchmark eﬀects are most evident) during each experiment. In
the first and second experiments the simulations do not involve contagion, but rather
an increase in global volatility conditions and benchmark asset volatility In the third
and fourth experiments contagion eﬀects are present from the US credit markets to
all other markets and from the US equity market to all other markets. Thus if the
tests are performing well they should distinguish the cases of increased volatility (by
accepting the null of no contagion) from the cases of contagion (experiments III and
IV).
In fact the tests are unsuccessful in distinguishing between the cases. In the case
of no contagion (experiments I and II), the FR test accepts the null of no contagion,
and the CCT test accepts the null of no contagion from the US credit market to 2
but rejects it in the case of 1 The BKS tests both indicate the presence of contagion
pairs of assets (originating with asset 3, the US). The CCT test for joint contagion,
shown in the final column of the Table, accepts the null of no contagion, but rejects
it using the BKS test. The results for experiment II are no more encouraging, with
rejection of the null of no contagion for all but the FR tests and the CCT test for
contagion from US credit markets to 2
In experiments III and IV where contagion eﬀects exist, the FR test continues to
accept the null of no contagion. The evidence on rejection of the null of no contagion
is more mixed for the other tests. Most of the CCT and BKS tests reject the null of
no contagion for most cases. However, the CCT test finds no contagion from US credit
markets to 1 in experiment III and the BKS finds no contagion to 2 In summary,
the FR test always finds no contagion, regardless of whether it exists, consistent with
the known poor size of this test, while the BKS test is likely to find contagion in most
situations. The CCT test is more mixed, but here finds more evidence of contagion
than it should. These results compound the diﬃculties in interpretation reported in
Section 2.
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5 Conclusion
Disentangling the eﬀects of contagion from increased volatility has important policy
implications. Prescribing the correct medicine will be more diﬃcult without an accurate
diagnosis of the source of infection. If contagion is the culprit there may be a cause for
reform of financial market infrastructure or regulatory policy. If increased volatility is
the cause then there may be macroeconomic reform required. The first requirement is
to understand the source of the diﬃculties.
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 the main focus of contagion testing
and financial reform had been on distinguishing increased common conditions volatility
from contagion eﬀects. Emerging markets seemed to evidence the largest contagion
eﬀects and developed markets acted merely as a transit for shocks between emerging
markets. However, the current crisis is intrinsically concerned with financial market
products from developed markets, and particularly from the US credit markets. This
has added a new layer to the complexity of understanding the crisis. Previously, US
credit markets were used as a benchmark asset in contagion studies, to either control
for common global conditions, or in calculating emerging market spreads.
This paper demonstrates that when contagion eﬀects are emanating from the bench-
mark asset it is even more diﬃcult to apply and interpret traditional contagion testing.
Using simulations of a latent factor model which has previously been shown to nest
most existing tests for contagion, the paper demonstrated that increased correlations
between asset markets may be due to any of increased volatility in common conditions,
contagion eﬀects or increased volatiltiy in a benchmark asset. But, equally, decreased
correlations between asset markets may be evidenced by increased volatility in bench-
mark assets or contagion eﬀects. The role of the benchmark asset can reinforce or
oﬀset the impact of other channels of transmission. The challenge arising is to develop
theoretical models which reflect these known data characteristics and accommodate
each of these scenarios, in order to be able to provide appropriate policy reform advice.
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Table 7:
Contagion tests on the simulated data from experiments I to IV. The tests are
performed on data with the parameters set as in Table 4 for the non-crisis parameters
with the additions of 1 = 5 in experiment I, 2 = 5 in experiment II,
 =  × 5 in experiment III, and  =  × 5 in experiment IV.
Experiment Test Recipient of contagion
1 2 1 and 2
Experiment I FR -0.102 -0.380 n.a.
(0.541) (0.648)
CCT 56.528* 0.538 2.707
(0.000) (0.463) (0.258)
BKS 40.295* 33.651* 91.879*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experiment II FR 0.545 -1.000 n.a.
(0.293) (0.841)
CCT 4.478* 0.646 5.191*
(0.034) (0.422) (0.075)
BKS 152.647* 46.954* 92.565*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experiment III FR -0.08 -0.285 n.a.
(0.532) (0.612)
CCT 0.564 47.222* 119.935*
(0.453) (0.000) (0.000)
BKS 31.256* 42.073* 59.171*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experiment IV FR -1.324 -0.448 n.a.
(0.907) (0.673)
CCT 49.008* 234.06* 966.725*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BKS 14.112* 0.111 4.186*
(0.000) (0.739) (0.041)
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